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MISINFORMATION THROUGH THE INTERNET: 
EPISTEMOLOGY AND ETHICS 
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Because information on the Internet can be used as a basis for decisions, 
actions, and policies, the quality of the information on the Internet is a morally 
significant issue. In judging the reliability of information from traditional 
sources, people generally apply secondary epistemic criteria. These concern the 
perceived reliability of the sources of the information rather than the 
information itself. Application of these criteria is ultimately based on 
institutionally embedded systems that confer authority and credibility on 
organizations and persons. Often, the secondary criteria cannot easily be 
applied to information on the Internet. In this chapter, I explain why this is so, 
and I argue that this situation is serious enough to call for special ethical 
reflection. I suggest that there are two strategies for coming to terms with this 
problem. The first is to develop a critical attitude in the persons who use the 
Internet and to show them ways of critically assessing the quality of the 
information on the Internet. The second consists in a quest for new secondary 
criteria or for new ways of applying traditional secondary criteria. Implementing 
both of these strategies may, however, conflict with normative principles 
regarding the freedom to provide and to receive information, with privacy 





Over the last few years, the Internet has become one of the most consulted 
sources of information. An essential characteristic of the Internet is its many-to-
many character. People who seek information can access the medium without 
much difficulty. For people who provide information, it is almost equally easy 
to distribute information. Because of both the ease with which the information 
is accessible and the ease with which information can be dispersed, it is also 
relatively easy to be misled and to mislead, intentionally or unintentionally. 
Misleading may occur in at least two ways. It may occur through the spread of 
incorrect or false information. It may also occur in the form of manipulated 
presentations of, in other respects, correct information. The latter is the case 
when the correct information is made to appear as stemming from suspicious 
sources or when it is presented in a different context in which it obtains a 
completely different meaning than its original one. Conversely, the seeker of 





misinterpret information that, in other respects, is correct. Because information 
is the basis of decisions, actions, and policy, the phenomenon of misinformation 
through the Internet calls for critical ethical assessment. 
It should be noted that throughout this contribution I use the term 
Ainformation@ to refer to information that is provided with the intention of 
distributing it publicly, and on the basis of which decisions for actions and 
policies can be made. I do not include information in the form of, for instance, 
pieces of music, footage, et cetera. These are primarily intended as artistic 
expressions or as entertainment. Nor do I concentrate on information in e-mail 
communications or information underlying e-commerce transactions. 
Perhaps I should also warn the reader beforehand that it is not my intention 
to depict the problems of misinformation as completely new ones. I am fully 
aware that certain problems similar to the ones that I will touch upon here have 
existed in one form or another already from the very first origins of (mass) 
media onward. As will become clear in the course of my argument, it is my 
opinion that these problems now in relation to the Internet are starting to occur 
on a much larger scale than ever before. Of course, many of the debates on 
ethical issues relating to new (information) technology sooner or later seem to 
fizzle out with the question whether these are really new ones. There is, 
however, no moral law telling us not to try to spend critically ethical reflection 
on problems that are not completely new. Such aloofness would even be a bit 
dramatic if, as seems to be the case with the problems at issue here, the ethical 
reflection was absent until now, although the problems, in one form or another, 
already existed for some time. 
 
 
2. Moral evaluation 
 
From a moral point of view, the situation as described gives rise to four clusters 
of questions. First, how should this situation be evaluated in moral terms from a 
general point of view? Is it at all bad that information on the Internet is not 
always reliable? In what way is information on the Internet different from the 
information from other sources? Do these differences justify special attention 
from a moral point of view? Second, what can or should be done eventually in 
order to warrant the reliability of information on the Internet? In what way 
could answers to this question amount to collective actions aimed at warranting 
or enhancing the reliability of information on the Internet? Is it not, for instance, 
the responsibility of the users of the information to check its reliability? Third, 
supposing that something should be done to enhance the reliability of 
information on the Internet, how should possible conflicts of these reliability-
enhancing measures with other normative principles be treated? Fourth, again 
supposing that something should be done, who or what institution can be 
considered to be responsible for guaranteeing the reliability of information on 
the net? 
These questions are not only important from an ethical perspective; for 
lawyers they are equally important. The ever-returning legal question 




concerning confidence in electronic information-provision processes, broadly 
taken, has to do with responsibility and liability for incorrect, incomplete, and 
illegitimate information. Furthermore, existing law entails all kinds of starting 
points but also possible restrictions on solutions to the questions relating to 
reliability. For the purposes of this paper, however, I will delimit myself to the 





Why are questions of reliability of information on the Internet morally 
significant? Misinformation through the Internet may have a trivial impact in 
certain cases. In others, however, its consequences can be serious. Individuals 
may sometimes take wrong decisions with important consequences for their 
own lives. A person may, for example, be misled by pseudoscientific 
information on certain quasi-medical sites, and decide not to have scientifically 
acknowledged medical therapy for a serious disease. Or he may come to be 
persuaded by pseudoscientific information and underestimate risks that are 
normally attached to certain kinds of behavior. Less dramatically, he may use 
incorrect information on the Internet for purposes of education, and in this way 
obstruct his own quest for truth. Of course, misinformation through the Internet 
may also have serious consequences for others than the direct recipient. The 
spread of lies conflicts with the quest for truth that is often held to be profitable 
for societies as a whole. Also, the Internet can be used to fuel existing 
prejudices against people or to introduce new ones. 
These are only some examples to illustrate in what ways the distribution of 
incorrect information and the manipulation of information on the Internet may 
have morally significant consequences. Already now, one may be tempted to 
ask: what is so special about misinformation through the Internet? Is providing 
wrong information through the Internet in any way different from deception 
through traditional media, such as newspapers, television, or radio? The 
Internet is different in at least two respects. 
First, the scale on which people (so-called Acontent providers@) can now 
spread information through the Internet is much larger than is the case with the 
traditional media. The relatively easy manner in which information can be 
divulged through the Internet, gives urgency to questions regarding the 
reliability of information on the Internet. 
Second, the Internet is different because of the absence, or at least the 
troubled applicability, of what I will call secondary epistemic criteria to 
information on the Internet. Turning to this aspect will enable me to become 
somewhat more specific about the way in which the problem of misinformation 






4. Primary epistemic criteria 
 
The exact character of the problematic status of misinformation through the 
Internet can be made more explicit by some reflection on criteria for assessing 
the reliability of information. What kinds of instruments do people have to 
measure the reliability of information? In judging the reliability of information, 
we can at least use four different types of criteria. I prefer to call these the four 
primary criteria of reliability. Berti and Graveleau labeled them neatly:1 
B criteria relating to intrinsic quality; 
B criteria relating to contextual quality; 
B criteria relating to management and presentation; 
B criteria relating to relative quality. 
Criteria relating to intrinsic quality are, for instance, requirements of 
consistency, coherence, accuracy, and accordance with observations. Criteria of 
contextual quality are, e.g., completeness and accordance with the latest 
observations. Criteria of management and presentation have to do with the 
interpretability, accessibility, and security of the information. Criteria of relative 
quality are, for instance, the applicability for the user and the relationship to 
comparable sets of information qua intrinsic and contextual quality and quality 
of management and presentation. 
Now, seekers of information themselves are often unable to assess the 
reliability of information in relation to the aforementioned primary criteria. 
They are generally no experts, and sometimes lack even the slightest knowledge 
of the topics about which they seek information. This applies equally to 
information published through the traditional media and to information 
published through new media such as the Internet. In order to judge whether one 
can trust the quality of information in the traditional media, most people seem 
to apply what I will call secondary epistemic criteria. 
 
 
5. Secondary epistemic criteria 
 
Secondary epistemic criteria are of a completely different kind. They have to do 
with the authority, trustworthiness, and credibility that are assigned to persons 
or organizations behind the information. Viewed rather superficially, this 
assignment of authority, trustworthiness and credibility may seem to happen on 
the basis of just the history of these persons or organizations, their reputation or 
the fact that others act as guarantors. On a deeper level, however, the 
application of secondary epistemic criteria appears to be based on an intricate 
complex of backgrounds of all kinds of manifest or latent recognition 
procedures for persons and organizations, traditions of reputations, and usage. 
Most of these are built in or embedded in conventions, social and institutional 
arrangements, and practices. 
                                                           
1 L. BERTI and D. GRAVELEAU, ADesigning and Filtering On-Line Information Quality: New 
Perspectives for Information Service Providers,@ in Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference 
on Ethical Issues of Information Technology, Ethicomp 98 (Rotterdam: EUR, 1998), pp. 79-88. 




People look for traces of the reliability of the information and of the 
information provider by gathering all kinds of indications about the background 
and the institutional setting of the source of information. People can find out, 
for example, whether the provider works at a university, what kind of university 
this is, whether it has a good reputation, whether it is recognized as one where 
people work according to commonly accepted methodological criteria, et cetera. 
Also, people seem to be attentive to the context in which the information is 
offered or made accessible, such as a university library, a reputed scientific 
journal, et cetera. 
The very possibility of applying these kinds of secondary criteria is often 
lacking where the Internet is concerned. Often, the content provider is 
anonymous or has only a virtual identity. Generally, the influence of individuals 
in the process of providing information on the Internet is diminishing, whereas 
the influence of intelligent systems is growing. Also, the lack of traditional 
intermediaries (such as libraries, librarians, specialized publishers) may have a 
negative influence on the capabilities of information seekers to assess the 
reliability of information. These kinds of factors, i.e., the lack of information 
about content providers, the diminishing human influence in the provision of 
information, and the lack of traditional intermediaries, are responsible for the 
fact that an information seeker often lacks clues or any indication whatsoever 
about the character, background, and institutional setting of the content 
provider. 
Adding to and further complicating the problem is the globalization that 
goes hand in hand with the Internet. Even when the recipient has some 
information about the content provider, he may not be able to assess the 
credibility of that provider. This is so, simply because often he will not be 
acquainted with backgrounds and institutional settings from all over the world, 
completely different societies, with completely different cultures. The 
recognition procedures and traditions that make up the institutional basis of the 
application of secondary epistemic criteria may be different in different 
cultures. A recipient from one culture may not recognize the procedures and 
traditions of the provider from another culture. It could even be that, if the 






Possible solutions to the problem of misinformation through the Internet, to my 
mind, are to be found in two strategies. These are not mutually exclusive but 
rather mutually supportive. 
The first strategy is one of developing a critical attitude in recipients. 
People can be taught not to believe everything that is on the Internet, but to 
keep a certain intellectual distance to what they find on it. In addition, they can 
be taught and trained to keep an open eye for possible positive or negative 





far as secondary criteria are concerned, these indicators can be traditional ones, 
as are known from traditional media, or new ones. The latter, however, will 
have to be especially developed. This is the point where the first strategy meets 
the second. 
The second strategy consists in enabling people to apply secondary 
epistemic criteria to the Internet. The ability to apply secondary epistemic 
criteria to the Internet requires three actions. First, in order to establish 
reliability there must be indicators of reliability, such as indications of the 
background or the organization from which the source of the information 
operates. Therefore, these indicators must be created or, in so far as they 
already exist, they must at least be pointed out, and made discernible for the 
recipient. Second, (an analogue of) the institutionally embedded credibility 
conferring backgrounds must be created, or, again, insofar as they are already 
present, they must be clearly pointed out. Regarding traditional media, these 
backgrounds consist of many different systems in many different forms, varying 
from different kinds of manifest or latent recognition procedures for persons 
and organizations to traditions of well-established reputations or just usage. 
Regarding the Internet, these backgrounds must, at least in part, be established 
anew. With respect to these freshly established backgrounds, then, third, at least 
some potential consensus or acceptance must be arrived at. 
Creating new credibility-conferring systems that have the same function as 
the traditional, partially institutionally embedded, ones, and preparing the 
possibility of global consensus or acceptance thereof, are undoubtedly difficult 
tasks. Nevertheless, the situation looks all but hopeless. Probably, the best thing 
to do is to start scrutinizing the ways in which the traditional credibility-
conferring systems work with regard to different kinds of information in 
different domains, to lay bare precisely the appropriateness and the 
inappropriateness of the application to information on the Internet, and then to 
find cures for the deficiencies. This may result in reparations of traditional 
systems or in fitting out partially or completely new ones. 
Perhaps some of the already existing systems, with some adjustments, will 
appear to be of use for information on the Internet. Here, one may think, for 
instance, of the possibly successful institution of Trusted Third Parties in the 
form of the General Post Office, the notary public, or accountants. Also, the 
struggle over domain names shows that traditionally well-known and reputed 
trademarks are chosen as domain names with an eye to Abranding.@ This comes 
down to building on already existing consumers= trust and confidence in the 
well-known players in the physical world. In the Netherlands, for instance, 
where there is a long tradition of public radio and television broadcasting 
corporations with different religious, cultural, or political identities, some of 
these well-known corporations have started offering free Internet access. Clients 
have their entry through a portal where they can click ready-made bookmarks 
and links which the corporation has chosen and approved on the basis of the 
nature of their content. But, of course, completely different and more 
encompassing systems are conceivable. Here, one may think of large systems, 
building on certification, licensing, and accreditation. 






7. Normative conflicts and responsibilities 
 
Specifying and implementing the two strategies as such is already difficult. 
Additional complexities, however, arise from the obvious possibilities of 
normative conflicts between the realization of reliability-enhancing measures on 
the one hand, and normative principles regarding individual autonomy, the 
freedom to provide and to gather information, and privacy norms, on the other 
hand. For reasons of enhancing the reliability of information on the Internet one 
may, for instance, consider restricting the possibilities of dispersing information 
anonymously. Doing so, however, may be detrimental to privacy and to the 
freedom of speech. Something similar will be the case with teaching people and 
enabling them to take a critical distance from information on the Internet. The 
point where the empowerment of individuals turns into paternalistic meddling is 
all too easily attained. 
Extremely problematic for the two strategies is the prevailing global moral 
pluralism. The Internet is a global medium par excellence. This means that the 
global moral pluralism is to be taken into account when credibility-conferring 
systems are designed or renovated. This is not only a matter of normative moral 
relativism, viz. the idea that different moral outlooks and varieties of moral 
viewpoints all have their own right of existence and ought to be tolerated and 
respected; it is, even more, a matter of effectiveness. Where systems clash with 
deeply felt convictions, they will not be accepted. 
Of course, all of this does not mean that trying to establish reliability-
enhancing measures must be abandoned, or even that conflicting norms must 
prevail on every occasion. The possibility of conflicts should make us careful 
and attentive to the constraints and deficiencies of reliability-enhancing 
measures. It invites us to assess meticulously the impact of each proposed 
system on the normative principles mentioned, and to balance the good of 
enhancing reliability against the possibly resulting moral loss. 
Of course, it must be found out what parties can or should take up 
responsibility in further designing and implementing the strategies aiming to 
enhance the reliability of information on the Internet. Apart from individual 
users of the Internet themselves, candidates for taking up responsibilities are: 
content providers, access and service providers, governments, and private 
organizations. Questions of accountability should be posed from a practical, a 
technical, and a moral perspective. Although, once again, these are difficult 
questions, trying to find a fair distribution of responsibilities and tasks is not a 
hopeless undertaking from the onset.2 
 
 
                                                           
2 A.H. VEDDER, ARethinking Moral Responsibility,@ in Proceedings for Computer Ethics: Philosophical 
Enquiry 2000. Conference Proceedings, ed. D. JOHNSON, J. MOOR, and H. TAVANI (Hanover, N.H.: 
Dartmouth, 2000), pp. 317-328. An extensively revised version will be published in Ethics and 







In this chapter, I explored and specified the problems that are connected to 
misinformation through the Internet. I suggested that there are two strategies for 
coming to terms with these problems. One is to develop a critical attitude in the 
persons who use the Internet. The second consists in finding new secondary 
criteria that are suitable for the Internet or new ways of applying traditional 
secondary criteria. I also showed that implementing these strategies may 
conflict with normative principles regarding the freedom to provide and to 
receive information, with privacy norms and with normative moral relativism. 
Further untangling and solving of the moral and epistemological problems 
relating to the quality of the information on the Internet may not only help to 
reduce misinformation. It may also provide us with deeper insights into the 
ways in which people normally judge the quality of the information, the 
different requirements regarding the reliability of information in different 
contexts and relative to different purposes, the ways in which people build up 
confidence and trust, and, finally, the role of the epistemic quality of 
information in moral decision-making. Thus, unraveling problems relating to 
the Internet opens up new perspectives. Challenges and possibilities of 
intellectual enrichment are awaiting us at the intersection of ethics and 
epistemology. 
 
